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Abstract 
Previous research has demonstrated that survival processing enhances memory for 
target words, more so than other well known deep processing conditions. Survival 
processing has also been reported to increase false memories, yet, this was only 
examined using short retention delay conditions. The present study aimed to 
examine the longevity of survival processing in terms of true and false memory. A 
sample of 60 participants was recruited using an opportunity and snowball sampling 
method. The encoding task involved the processing of categorised nouns (category 
repetition procedure), by rating their relevance to either a survival or moving 
scenario, or by rating their pleasantness. After a delay of either five minutes or 
twenty-four hours, a surprise recognition test of the encoded words was given. The 
number of ‘yes’ responses to studied items (true memory), associated critical items 
and nonassociated items (false memory) were measured. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, the results revealed that survival processing, after a twenty-four-hour 
delay, led to a reduction in true memory. Potential reasons for this unexpected result 
are discussed with an emphasis on the use of the category repetition procedure. The 
twenty-four-hour delay also lead to an increase in false memory. This calls for 
additional research on survival based false memories after an extended delay 
between encoding and retrieval, in order to conclude whether false memory 
functions as an adaptive memory strategy.  
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Investigating the Longevity of Survival Based Processing in Relation to True 
and False Memories 
 
Cognitive Adaptations 
Evolutionary psychologists (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005; Klein et al., 2002) highlight 
the importance of our ancestral environments and assert that natural selection 
results in cognitive adaptations. Cognitive adaptations, such as memory, helped to 
solve problems (E.g., finding food) in our ancestral past (Nairne et al., 2007). From 
an evolutionary standpoint, memory is believed to have selectively evolved for the 
purpose of survival and increasing reproductive fitness (Nairne et al., 2007; Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008). It has been argued that memory has evolved to be content 
sensitive rather than domain-general, as the retention of some information (E.g., the 
location of a predator) is more important due to its fitness relevance (Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008). Thus, researchers anticipated that survival-relevant information 
will produce a mnemonic advantage (Nairne et al., 2007; Butler et al., 2009). That is, 
when information in processed for its survival relevance, memorability for that 
information should increase. 
 
Survival Processing 
To test whether mnemonic advantage does, in fact, exist when processing words for 
their survival relevance, Nairne et al. (2007) employed a functional approach and 
developed the survival processing paradigm. The standard survival processing 
paradigm consists of an incidental learning task, in which subjects are asked to rate 
a list of randomly selected words for their relevance to a survival scenario. This 
scenario involves participants imagining themselves being stranded in grasslands of 
a foreign place. They do not have any necessary survival items, and their aim is to 
find food and protection from predators. After the rating task and a short 
(approximately five minutes) delay, subjects are given a surprise retention test of the 
rated words. Results revealed that more words were remembered when processed 
in terms of survival, compared to matched encoding scenarios, such as moving 
home or vacationing (E.g., Nairne et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Nairne et al., 2008). 
Their findings lead to the conclusion that processing words for their survival 
relevance does, in fact, result in a mnemonic advantage. 
 
As a result of numerous replications and extensions of the survival processing 
paradigm, the validity and robustness of the survival mnemonic phenomena 
strengthened. Various procedures and variable manipulations were employed. 
Researchers produced the survival mnemonic advantage using: within and between-
subject designs (Nairne et al., 2007); varied age groups (Aslan & Bauml, 2012; 
Nairne et al., 2007; Pandeirada et al., 2014); and free recall as well as recognition 
tests (Kang et al., 2008; Nairne et al., 2008, 2007). Most importantly, memory levels, 
following survival processing, were higher when compared to various ‘deep 
processing’ conditions (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). These include intentional learning, 
pleasantness ratings and imagery (e.g., Nairne et al., 2008; Otgaar et al., 2011). 
Consequently, survival processing was concluded to be the best incidental encoding 
technique currently known in memory research (Nairne, 2010). 
 
Nonetheless, all of the aforementioned studies used short retention intervals 
between learning and retrieval. Clark and Bruno (2015) argued the importance of 
remembering survival based information for prolonged period of time in order for it to 
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aid future survival situations. Hence, the above-mentioned studies lack a focus on 
the longevity of survival processing advantage. The next section will discuss 
research which aimed to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
Longevity of Survival Processing 
Raymeakers et al. (2014) tested the longevity of survival processing advantage, to 
ascertain whether it truly holds adaptive value. To research this, they replicated the 
original survival processing paradigm, but instead of using only short retention 
intervals, they used delay periods of 24 and 48-hours. Results showed that, 
regardless of the time of testing, the survival condition produced higher retention 
scores, relative to a moving condition. This was the case for tests of free recall and 
recognition. Abel and Bäuml (2013) investigated recognition and recall levels 
between survival processing and a pleasantness task and, too, did not fail to find 
survival mnemonic advantage to last after 48 hours. Additionally, Clark and Bruno 
(2015), using a within-participants design, reported survival processing to enhance 
free recall, location based, memory after a 96-hour retention delay. A four-day 
retention delay was used because four to five days after encoding is where most of 
the forgetting supposedly occurs (Ebbinghaus, 1964). Since survival processing 
mnemonic advantage has the ability to last through extended retention delays, it was 
concluded that aspects of our memory system serve an adaptive function in 
remembering important events for the purpose of long-term planning (Raymeakers et 
al., 2014). 
 
However, it is worth noting that, although the above-mentioned researchers have 
found the survival processing advantage in the different retention delay conditions, 
there was a general memory reduction with the increase of retention delay time 
(Clark & Bruno, 2015; Raymeakers et al., 2014).  On the basis of the above findings, 
the current research aimed to investigate the effects of survival processing and delay 
on memory. Levels of true memories following survival processing (and control 
processing conditions) were compared between a twenty-four-hour and a five-minute 
retention delay. Although a general reduction of retention levels in the twenty-four-
hour condition was expected, an overall improvement in memory following survival 
processing, relative to control conditions, was anticipated. In addition to the study of 
true memory, false memory was a key focus of this experiment. This is because 
research has shown survival processing to not only effect true memory but also false 
memory. The following section will give an overview of false memory in relation to 
survival processing. 
 
False Memory 
False memory has been defined as a subjective recollection of past occurrences 
which did not occur (Arndt, 2012). They have been proposed to occur as a result of 
the reconstructive nature of memory (Gallo & Lampinen, 2015). Existing research in 
the field of survival processing has primarily focused on true memory. Nonetheless, 
some researchers did investigate the prevalence of false memory (alongside true 
memory) as a consequence of survival processing. Since survival processing is an 
adaptive memory strategy, it should not only increase true memory but 
simultaneously decrease the susceptibility to false memory (Otgaar & Smeets, 
2010). However, the general finding revealed that survival processing increased not 
only true memories but also false memories of non-presented words (Nairne et al., 
2007, Experiment 1; Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; Howe, 2011).  
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In Otgaar and Smeets’ (2010) study, for example, when the net accuracy score with 
total output was calculated from all three of their experiments, no overall survival 
recall advantage was apparent. Therefore, these findings question the adaptive 
memory strategy of survival processing (Otgaar & Smeets, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, alternative research indicates that false memory from survival 
processing can function as an adaptive memory strategy. According to Howe and 
Derbish (2010), false memories arising from survival processing can be a by-product 
of the fitness-relevant mechanism. Activation of semantically related information can 
function as a guidance to other survival-relevant information resulting in enhanced 
survivability. Alternatively, false memory itself may serve an adaptive function 
(Howe, 2011). For example, as noted by Howe and Derbish (2010), falsely 
remembering the presence of a predator in a location which only had signs of a 
predator can be advantageous for one’s survival. Therefore, false memory from 
survival processing can lead to adaptive consequences. Problem-solving is one of 
the adaptive consequences that false memories from survival processing can 
enhance. Gardner and Howe (2014) investigated the survival advantage of false 
memory using a compound remote associative task, which was primed by false 
memories. They found that the survival condition led to more false memories and 
improved subsequent task solving, more so than a moving condition. This indicates 
that false memories, from survival processing, facilitate problem-solving more so 
than false memories from other processing conditions, such as a moving condition. 
This is further validated by other research (E.g., Howe, 2011; Howe et al., 2011; 
Howe et al., 2013), which further supports the adaptive function of false memories 
from survival processing. 
 
However, no research has yet investigated the effects of survival processing on false 
memories after an extended retention delay. Therefore, it is unknown whether 
survival processing would increase the vulnerability to false memories after, for 
example, twenty-four hours between encoding and retrieval. Investigation of this was 
the central focus of this experiment. Using a twenty-four-hour delay, the researcher 
investigated the effects of retention delay on false memory, following various 
processing scenarios. False memory was induced in each processing condition by 
the use of the category repetition procedure. This procedure is introduced in the next 
section, alongside explanations for the occurrence of false memory when the 
category repetition procedure is used.  
 
Inducing False Memory 
Various paradigms can be used to induce and study false memory. Of these, the 
DRM and category repetition procedures are the most widely used. The DRM 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) was employed in Otgaar and 
Smeets’ (2010) experiments 1 and 2. It is specifically constructed to prompt false 
memories; thus, as pointed out by Otgaar and Smeets (2010), it can be argued to 
bias the survival recall results. For this reason, Otgaar and Smeets used the 
category repetition procedure (Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999) in Experiment 3, as it 
was not specifically created to trigger false memory. Although levels of false memory 
dropped, they nonetheless found false memory levels to be higher for survival 
processing, relative to other processing conditions. Hence, the current experiment 
also used the category repetition procedure. More specifically, categories from 
Overschelde’s et al. (2004) category norms were selected. Overschelde et al. (2004) 
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adapted the norms of Battig and Montague (1969), by adding 14 new categories, as 
they believed that people’s knowledge of category membership was not accurately 
reflected by the norms of Battig and Montague. 
 
The category repetition procedure involves participants learning a list of words from 
taxonomic semantic categories. During recognition tests, non-studied words (critical 
exemplar lures) from a target category are frequently falsely recognised (Dewhurst, 
2001; Dewhurst & Farrand, 2004). For example, following the study of a list of fruits 
such as mango, strawberry, orange etc. the subject is likely to falsely recognise the 
non-presented exemplar, apple. Dewhurst and Anderson (1999) varied the number 
of words presented to participants and found that with the increase of presented 
words, critical lures were more often falsely recognised. They also investigated the 
strength of false memories by exploring participant’s subjective states of awareness 
for recognised words. To do this, they employed the remember-know procedure 
(Tulving, 1985), which will be discussed later. They found that with the increase of 
words from the same category, more ‘remember’ and ‘know’ responses 
accompanied the non-presented words. This means that the responses were not 
merely guesses but were false memories. One possible explanation for the 
occurrence of false memory is presented below. 
The activation-monitoring account helps to understand why false recall and 
recognition occurs in paradigms such as the category repetition procedure 
(Dewhurst, 2001). The monitoring component suggests that memory errors occur 
due to source monitoring failure. The activation component suggests a spontaneous 
generation of associates of presented words (Underwood, 1965). Dewhurst et al. 
(2005), using the remember-know procedure, found that when a secondary task is 
performed to interfere with the generation of associates, the number of false 
‘remember’ responses decreased. Whereas, the encouragement of associates 
generation increased false ‘remember’ responses. Their findings support the view 
that activation of semantic associates produces false memories of non-studied words 
from a category. Measuring the subjective experiences of recognised words is 
important to understand how strong that recognition level is. For this reason, this 
experiment utilised the remember-know procedure, which is described below. 
 
Remember-Know Procedure 
The remember-know procedure, introduced by Tulving (1985), helps to understand 
states of awareness that come with retrieval. It assumes that judgments in 
recognition memory are based on two distinct memory systems: remembering and 
knowing. Tulving described remembering as a conscious recollection and a reflection 
of episodic memory (memory for personal events). Knowing, on the other hand, was 
described as a reflection of semantic memory (impersonal, factual knowledge). 
However, knowing judgements can be attributed to episodic events, thus, other 
researchers describe knowing as a feeling of familiarity (Madler, 1980). A ‘guess’ 
response is often incorporated into experiments. Gardiner et al. (1998) assert that 
the guess response also reflects feelings of familiarity, but it is different to knowing 
by its use of numerous inferences which are not directly linked to memory. According 
to Miller and Wolford (1999), subjects may state that they recognise a word from a 
list because they have a response bias toward it, as it relates to the studied list. So, 
responses may simply be guesses with no actual false memory. Therefore, it is 
essential to measure the subjective experiences that accompany participant’s 
responses to identify false memories. The current experiment utilised the ‘remember-
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know’ procedure, as a way of examining subjective experiences of true and false 
memories of recognised words. 
 
Current Study 
On the basis of the above research, the current study employed the category 
repetition procedure (Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999), by drawing categories from 
Overschelde’s et al. (2004) category norms to induce false recognition. The 
remember-know procedure (Tulving, 1985) was used to examine participant’s 
subjective experiences of recognition. True and false recognition was examined in 
relation three different processing conditions (survival, moving, pleasantness) and 
two retention delay conditions (24-hours, 5-minutes). The principal aim was to 
investigate whether survival processing yields different levels of true and false 
memories in immediate and delayed retention tests, relative to control processing 
conditions. In line with previous findings, it was hypothesised that, on both immediate 
tests and following a twenty-four-hour delay, survival processing will produce higher 
levels of true memory relative to other processing conditions. An overall decrease in 
true memories with the one-day delay was expected, as this was the general finding 
with past research. In addition, the current experiment aimed to assess if the 
memory advantage for the survival condition remained constant over a delay period. 
Since previous research indicates that survival processing, relative to other 
processing conditions, yields higher levels of associative false memory after a short 
delay, this was expected in the current research. In addition, the current research 
tested whether this effect persisted after a twenty-four-hour delay. A confirmation of 
this hypothesis will indicate that false memory is adaptive and functions in a survival-
enhancing manner.  
 
Methodology 
 
Participants 
Sixty participants (43 females, 17 males), living in Manchester, took part in this 
experiment. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 35. The sample was 
obtained via an opportunity and a snowball sampling methods. The aim was to 
gather a sample size close to the sample (N=81) used by Raymeakers et al. (2014). 
All of the participants were 18 years old or over so they could provide their own 
consent to take part in the experiment.  
 
Design 
An experimental design, consisting of two Independent Variables (IV) and four 
Dependent Variables (DV), was used in this experiment. The first IV was the 
encoding task. It was manipulated between subjects with individuals randomly 
allocated to one of three levels; survival vs. moving vs. pleasantness (ten 
participants per condition). The second IV was the length of delay between encoding 
and memory test. It was manipulated between subjects with individuals randomly 
allocated to either a 5-minute delay test condition or a 24-hour delay test condition 
(30 participants per condition). A between-subject design was important in this 
experiment to effectively compare recognition performance between the processing 
and the retention conditions.  
 
Four dependent variables were used in this experiment. ‘Yes’ responses indicate 
recognition in the retention test. The first DV was the ‘yes’ response to studied 
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words. DV two was the ‘yes’ response to critical lures from studied lists. The third DV 
was ‘yes’ response to the non-studied words from the non-studied list. The fourth DV 
was ‘yes’ response to critical lures from the non-studied list. Each of these four main 
dependent variables were further sub-divided into ‘recognise’, ‘know’ or ‘guess’, to 
help to determine false recollections.   
 
Apparatus & Materials 
A category repetition procedure (Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999) was used to present 
subjects with a standard categorised list. A total of 14 categories were selected from 
Overschelde’s et al. (2004) category norms. The use of standardised categories in 
an experimental setting allowed for the manipulation of false memory production 
across all processing conditions. The selection criteria for this experiment included 
categories that possess the labels of one word (including hyphened words), that 
were nouns, and that were familiar to the participants. Within each of the 14 
gathered lists, the top 11 ranked items were selected, the first of these were the 
most dominant exemplar of the category (critical lure), which were not presented at 
learning. For example, for the category ‘fruits’, the most dominant exemplar is 
‘apple’, which was only presented in the recognition test. The 14 categories were 
divided randomly into two 7’s for the purpose of counterbalancing. Only 7 of these 
were presented during learning. The other 7 categories were incorporated with the 
learnt list for the recognition test. The words from both groups (learnt and non-learnt) 
were presented on two different PowerPoint slides with one word per page. Each 
word was presented in bold, Arial Black font, and size 60.  
 
Additionally, the remember-know procedure (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) was 
used in the recognition part of the experiment. After the participants responded with 
a ‘yes’ (recognition) for the words presented in the recognition test, they were 
required to state how strong the recognition memory was for each word by saying 
‘remember’ (conscious recollection), ‘know’ (feeling of familiarity) or ‘guess’. This 
procedure helped to determine whether false recognition responses were actually 
false memories. 
 
Procedure 
Subjects entered the experimental room believing that the experiment is based on 
cognitive ability and the processing of words. It was vital that the participants were 
unaware that the experiment was measuring memory for incidental learning to be 
possible. Before the experiment commenced, participants were asked to provide a 
written consent. Each subject was assigned to one of the three processing 
conditions. The conditions, pleasantness, survival and moving were used, worded in 
a similar way to those used in the experiments of Nairne et al. (2007). In the 
pleasantness condition, subject rated words for their pleasantness. In the survival 
condition, subjects rated words for their relevance to a survival situation. In the 
moving scenario, subjects rated words for their relevance to moving a house. In each 
condition, a list of 70 words (10 words per category) was presented in categorical 
order. Each word was timed to show for 5 seconds each, followed by a blank screen 
to give time to respond. The participants were asked to rate each word on a 5-point 
scale, with 1 being extremely unpleasant/ extremely irrelevant, to 5 being extremely 
pleasant/ extremely relevant. To eliminate the potential confound of processing time, 
participants were asked to rate each word within 5 seconds after the word was 
presented. This task was the incidental learning phase. Following the completion of 
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the task, subjects in the short interval condition engaged in a 2-minute nonverbal 
distractor task (Tetris), while subjects in the delayed condition went home and were 
asked to return the next day for additional testing. 
 
Following the 2-minute or 24-hour delay, participants were given instructions for the 
surprise recognition test. Note that in the short interval conditions, the 2-minute 
Tetris game and the time used to give instructions for the recognition test were 
added to give an approximate overall 5-miute delay between encoding and retrieval. 
The recognition test involved the presentation of studied and non-studied words from 
each category (ranked 4 and 7) as well as studied and non-studied critical lures 
(ranked 1) from each category. A total of 42 words were presented during the 
recognition test. The participants verbally stated whether they recognise each word 
from the previous list of words. For each ‘yes’ response, the participants further 
stated whether their responses were accompanied by recollective experience, 
knowing or simply a guess. Upon completion of the experiment, all subjects were 
fully debriefed and informed of the true aims of the study. They provided an 
anonymous personal code by which their results could be identified by if they 
subsequently wished to withdraw their results from the study. All of the data was 
secured by a password-protected computer, and the raw data was deleted upon 
analysis completion.  
 
Results  
 
Overview of Results 
The number of yes responses to each type of item (studied, critical lure and 
unrelated) were entered into sets of univariate ANOVAs. These comprised a series 
of 3 (Encoding task; survival vs. moving vs. pleasant) between-subjects by 2 (Delay; 
5 mins vs. 1 day) between-subjects ANOVAs. These were further subdivided into 
remember, know and guess responses. Results for different response types are 
presented in separate sections below.  
  
True Memory 
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. The analysis on overall true 
memory revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding task, F(2, 54) = 1.22, p = 
.30. The main effect of delay was marginally significant, F(1, 54) = 3.11, p = .08, with 
slightly more overall true memories in the five-minute delay. The interaction was 
significant, F(2, 54) = 4.81, p = .01. This interaction was assessed further by the use 
of simple main effects comparing delay at each level of the encoding task. This was 
done by the use of independent t-tests, which revealed a significant difference 
between the five-minute and the one-day condition for survival processed words, 
t(9.22) = 2.51, p =  .03 (Levine’s adjusted), showing fewer true memories after a one-
day delay. The effect of delay had no influence in the pleasant or moving conditions, 
t(18) = 0.47, p =  .79 and, t(18) = 0.72, p =  .48 respectively. Additional comparisons 
were made between the survival condition and the other encoding conditions at each 
level of delay. This demonstrated no significant differences across any comparison 
apart from that between survival and moving at the one-day delay t(18) = 2.14, p = 
.05. All other comparisons demonstrated p’s > .05.  
 
The analysis on remember responses revealed a non-significant main effect of 
encoding task, F(2, 54) = 1.03, p = .0.37. The main effect of delay was not 
Page 10 of 19 
 
 
significant, F(1, 54) =2.01, p = .16. The interaction was marginally significant, F(2, 
54) = 2.95, p = .06. Inspection of the means for the remember responses showed a 
similar pattern of results to overall responses with the largest numerical difference 
between the five-minute and one-day delay for the survival condition. There were 
less remember responses after a one-day delay.  
 
The analysis on know responses revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding 
task, F(2, 54) = 0.32, p = .73. The main effect of delay was not significant, F(1, 54) 
=0.03, p = .87. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 54) = 0.54, p = .59.  
 
The analysis on guess responses revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding 
task, F(2, 54) = 0.83, p = .44. The main effect of delay was marginally significant, 
F(1, 54) =3.08 p = .08. There were slightly more guess responses after a one-day 
delay. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 54) = 1.14, p = .33.  
 
 
Table 1 
Mean and standard deviation of true memory for encoding tasks, delay, and 
remember, know, guess responses. 
 
   Encoding Condition  
  Survival Moving Pleasantness 
  M SD  M SD  M SD  
Delay     
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Overall 
 
13.90    0.32 
 
11.60    2.88 
 
13.20    1.62 
 
13.60    0.70 
13.40    0.97 
 
13.30    0.67 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Remember 
 
11.50    2.99 
 
7.80     3.49 
10.80    4.32 
 
10.50    2.01 
10.60    2.46 
 
11.30    2.06 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Know 
 
2.10     2.88 
 
2.80     2.30 
2.20     3.01 
 
2.60     2.12 
2.30     2.31 
 
1.50     1.65 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
Guess 
 
0.30     0.67 
 
1.00     1.05 
0.20     0.42 
 
0.50     0.97 
0.50     0.53 
 
0.50     0.53 
 
 
False Memory for Critical Items 
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2. The analysis on associative false 
memory revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding task, F(2, 54) = 1.54, p = 
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.22. The main effect of delay was significant, F(1, 54) =11.21, p = .001, showing 
more overall associative false memories after one day. The interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 54) = .06, p = .94.  
 
The analysis on remember responses revealed a non-significant main effect of 
encoding task, F(2, 54) = .45, p = .64. The main effect of delay was not significant, 
F(1, 54) =.6, p = .44. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 54) = .17, p = .85.  
 
The analysis on know responses revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding 
task, F(2, 54) = 1.54, p = .22. The main effect of delay was significant, F(1, 54) 
=9.13, p = .004, showing more know responses after one day. The interaction was 
not significant, F(2, 54) = .33, p = .72.  
 
The analysis on guess responses revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding 
task, F(2, 54) = .06, p = .0.94. The main effect of delay was not significant, F(1, 54) 
=1.60, p = .21. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 54) = .6, p = .55.  
 
Table 2 
Mean and standard deviation of associative false memory for encoding tasks, 
delay, and remember, know, guess responses. 
 
   Encoding Condition  
  Survival Moving Pleasantness 
  M SD  M SD  M SD  
Delay 
 
    
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Overall 
 
3.50     2.37 
 
5.10     1.73 
 
3.70     1.42 
 
5.50     1.58 
 
2.90     2.08 
 
4.30     1.77 
 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Remember 
 
1.40     1.84 
 
1.80     1.81 
 
1.90     1.10 
 
1.90     1.60 
1.10     1.91 
 
1.70     1.64 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Know 
 
1.00     0.94 
 
1.50     1.27 
 
0.90     1.10 
 
1.90     1.20 
0.40     0.52 
 
1.30     0.95 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
Guess 
 
1.10     1.20 
 
1.80     1.40 
0.90     1.37 
 
1.70     2.00 
1.40     1.35 
 
1.30     1.06 
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False Memory for Unrelated Items 
These were computed by averaging together the yes responses to the critical lures 
from non-presented lists with the non-presented words from non-presented lists. The 
descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3. The analysis on unassociated false 
memory revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding task, F(2, 54) = .69, p = 
.51. The main effect of delay was significant, F(1, 54) =6.83, p = .01, showing more 
unassociated false memories after one day. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 
54) = 1.36, p = .27.  
 
The analysis on remember responses revealed a non-significant main effect of 
encoding task, F(2, 54) = .17, p = .85. The main effect of delay was not significant, 
F(1, 54) =1.05, p = .31. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 54) = 1.17, p = .32.  
 
The analysis on know responses revealed a non-significant main effect of encoding 
task, F(2, 54) = .48, p = .62. The main effect of delay was significant, F(1, 54) =6.77, 
p = .01, which revealed more know responses after one day. The interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 54) = .00, p = 1.00.  
 
The analysis on guess responses revealed a significant main effect of encoding task, 
F(2, 54) = 3.14, p = .05. The highest number of guess responses were in the 
pleasantness condition. The main effect of delay was marginally significant, F(1, 54) 
=3.68, p = .06, which revealed slightly more guess responses after one day. The 
interaction was not significant, F(2, 54) = 1.76, p = .18.  
 
Table 3 
Mean and standard deviation of unassociated false memory for encoding 
tasks, delay, and remember, know, guess responses. 
 
   Encoding Condition  
  Survival Moving Pleasantness 
  M SD  M SD  M SD  
Delay     
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Overall 
 
0.30     0.54 
 
0.45     0.76 
 
0.10     0.21 
 
1.15     1.42 
 
0.40     0.81 
 
0.95     0.56 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Remember 
 
0.10     0.32 
 
0.05     0.16 
 
0.00     0.00 
 
0.25     0.63 
0.05     0.16 
 
0.10      0.21 
5 min 
 
1 day 
 
 
 
Know 
 
0.10     0.21 
 
0.35     0.63 
 
0.10     0.21 
 
0.35     0.41 
0.00     0.00 
 
0.25     0.42 
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5 min 
 
1 day 
 
Guess 
 
0.10     0.21 
 
0.05     0.16 
0.00     0.00 
 
0.55     0.69 
0.35     0.78 
 
0.60     0.61 
 
 
Summary of True Memory Results 
The analysis revealed that survival processing did not produce any memory 
advantage on the immediate test of memory. Thus, the survival processing effect 
was not replicated. A difference only emerged after a 24-hour delay and was 
opposite to that hypothesised; there was a reduction in true memory and remember 
responses and a slight increase in guess responses, which indicates low confidence 
levels of recognition. Essentially, this experiment did not find a survival processing 
advantage for categorised word lists after a twenty-four- hour delay.  
 
Summary of False Memory for Critical Items Results 
The analysis revealed that associative false memory was greater after a delay and 
this was largely reflected in the know responses. There was no interaction between 
encoding task and delay for associative false memory and for different response 
types. 
 
Summary of False Memory for Unrelated Items Results 
The results revealed that overall unassociated false memory was greater after one 
day. This was mainly reflected by know responses, and guess responses to a lesser 
extent. The interaction between encoding task and delay for unassociated false 
memory was not significant overall and for different response types. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the levels of true and false memories following 
survival processing after five minutes and a one-day retention delay. Note that the 
results for true and false memory are discussed separately.  
 
Although a general decrease in true memory after a twenty-four-hour delay was 
expected, it was hypothesised that true memory would be higher after survival 
processing relative to other processing conditions. A confirmation of this prediction 
would have further validated past research on the longevity of survival processing. 
Hence, it would have confirmed the adaptive function of memory in serving long-term 
survival goals (Raymeakers et al., 2014).  
 
However, contrary to the predictions, the results have shown that following survival 
processing, true memories declined after a one-day delay. In line with past research 
(Raymeakers et al., 2014; Clark & Bruno, 2015), a general decline in true memories 
after one day was expected, partly due to the traditional understanding that memory 
deteriorates after prolonged retention intervals (Ebbinghausian, 1964). Nonetheless, 
true memories after a one-day delay were expected to be higher for survival 
processing than for other processing conditions. This was not reflected in the results 
because a one-day delay affected (decreased) true memories for only survival 
processing and not other processing conditions. Essentially, true memory levels 
were the lowest for survival condition after one day. These results stand in contrast 
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to previous research findings of survival processing leading to a mnemonic 
advantage after an extended retention delay (including 24 hours) (Abel & Bäuml, 
2013; Raymeakers et al., 2014; Clark & Bruno, 2015). 
 
There is no clear answer as to why the survival processing advantage was not found 
in this study. For this reason, three possible explanations will be considered. 
Perchance, the hypothesis was not confirmed due to the use of the category 
repetition procedure. It is possible that the use of categorised words led subjects to 
process words in an interrelated manner across all encoding tasks and therefore 
influenced memory equally. However, this cannot represent the whole of the answer 
because a difference did emerge after a one-day delay. Alternatively, perhaps the 
survival processing advantage was not found because the sample size was relatively 
small. Only ten participants per encoding and delay condition potentially were not 
enough to achieve the survival processing effect. A sample closer to the number of 
participants (81) used in the study by Raymeakers et al. (2014), may have helped to 
produce the survival processing advantage. 
 
A final consideration is that of congruity. Congruity effect is referred to as superior 
retention of items when they match with the type of processing (Nairne et al., 2007). 
For example, when processing survival type words for their survival relevance, the 
retention of those words improves. This is because the memory system is tuned to 
remember material that is relevant to the goal of processing (Butler et al., 2009). 
Butler et al. (2009) in experiments 2 and 3, found that when types of words and the 
processing task are congruent, recall performance was highest. Therefore, perhaps 
the current study did not find survival advantage because of the incongruency effect. 
If the current study used items which were congruent with the processing task, 
survival processing advantage may have occurred. This is not always the case, 
though, as congruency between items and task does not always lead to survival 
recall advantage, as shown in Butler’s et al. (2009) experiments 2 and 3. This 
indicates that congruence is not necessary to produce the survival processing effect. 
Nevertheless, their use of mixed list of high and low relevance words may be the 
reason for this result. Therefore, more research is required to understand the 
boundary conditions under which the survival processing advantage occurs. 
Consequently, the incongruency effect in the categorised words can only partly 
explain the reason for not finding the survival processing advantage in the current 
experiment. Although a definite answer is unknown, all three points discussed could 
have contributed to the results obtained. For this reason, future research should 
focus on obtaining a larger sample than the one used in this study. Extra precaution 
should also be taken with the material, especially if categorised words are used. 
Using categorised words that are congruent with the processing task may be 
advantageous in aiding survival processing effect to occur.  
 
In terms of false memory, the results revealed an overall higher level of associated 
and unassociated false memories after a one-day delay relative to five-minute delay. 
This was mainly reflected in the know responses, which indicates feelings of 
familiarity. The fact that there was no interaction between delay and encoding tasks 
shows that all encoding conditions, rather than isolated survival condition, led to 
increased false memory. Yet, it was hypothesised that survival condition, as opposed 
to other processing conditions, after a one-day delay would lead to an increase in 
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false memories. So, although a general increase in false memories was found, this 
was not reflected in just survival processing condition, as hypothesised. 
 
Previous work (Nairne et al., 2007, Experiment 1; Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & 
Smeets, 2010; Howe, 2011) reported that, after a short retention delay, survival 
processing leads to more false memories than control scenarios. Using these 
findings, researchers have speculated and assessed whether increased survival 
based false memory functions as an adaptive memory strategy, or if in fact, it does 
the opposite. The majority of research draws on the idea that survival based false 
memories can lead to adaptive consequences such as enhanced survivability and 
improved problem-solving skills (E.g., Howe & Derbish, 2010; Howe, 2011; Gardner 
& Howe, 2014). However, the research that these speculations draw from involved 
only short retention delay periods. Yet, Clark and Bruno (2015) argued that, for 
survival advantage to be an adaptive memory strategy, it must last over an extended 
period of time. Although Clark and Bruno were referring to true memories, the same 
should apply for false memories. Since survival based false memories are said to be 
an adaptive memory strategy, then expectantly, over an extended retention delay, 
they should remain higher than false memories from other conditions. Only this way 
the information can be used for future survival situations. However, the current 
research, after a twenty-four-hour delay, did not find survival processing to increase 
false memories any more than the other conditions. Thus, arguably, survival based 
false memory cannot be an adaptive memory strategy, as claimed by researchers 
such as Howe (2011), because it is no bigger than false memories from other 
processing conditions.  
 
This research was the first to investigate the effects of survival processing on false 
memories, after prolonged retention delay. Thus, research is yet to investigate the 
advantage of survival based false memory, after an extended delay, on processes 
such as problem-solving. This shift of focus on the longevity of survival based false 
memory will help to verify whether activation of survival-relevant associates can be 
an adaptive function of memory for enhancing survivability. But, with the current 
findings, it appears that false memory from survival processing cannot be said to be 
an adaptive memory strategy because the observed increase in false memories was 
the product of not only survival processing.  
 
Overall, the results revealed that the survival processing advantage, in terms of true 
memory, can be absent in research under certain circumstances. The use of the 
category repetition procedure appears to have been a limitation in this research due 
to potentially preventing survival processing effect. For this reason, future research is 
advised to use categories which are congruent with the processing task. This study 
was the first to investigate survival based associative false memories after a delay of 
24 hours. Since false memories did not increase specifically due to survival 
processing, the current findings question whether survival based false memories are 
truly an adaptive memory strategy. These findings call for more research on survival 
based false memories after a delay of 24 hours or longer. Only this way, conclusions 
regarding the advantages of survival based false memory can be made. It is worth 
noting that, since the sample used in this study was not large enough and consisted 
on mostly female participant (43 out of 60), future studies should gather a larger and 
more representative sample of both sexes. Nonetheless, overall, this study has 
contributed to the understanding of associative false memories following survival 
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processing. It has also revealed that the items studied can influence whether a 
survival processing advantage appears, which informs future research to take extra 
precaution with study materials. 
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